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ABSTRACT
Metagovernance refers to a theory of how governments steer decentralised
networks by indirectly shaping the rules and norms of those networks. This
article develops metagovernance conceptually and empirically by looking at
the use of ‘hands-oﬀ’ metagovernance tools in the case of English devolution,
which encompass the ‘designing’ and ‘framing’ of local governance networks
in the process of their reconﬁguration. These concepts provide insights into
how a Conservative-led Coalition Government subtly centralised power in the
process of devolution to city-regions. Our analysis shows how discursive
framing, ﬁscal conditioning and the recomposition of local governance net-
works produced a reworking of centre-local and intra-local power relations in
a way which allowed the Treasury to shape the priorities of a set of ‘devolution
deals’ with regional authorities, emphasising boosting economic growth and
improving public services.
KEYWORDS Metagovernance; English devolution; Northern powerhouse; network governance; network
design; network framing; decentralisation
Introduction
Studies of governance in West European states have in recent times sought
to discern the extent to which such states exercise power within increasingly
complex and diﬀerentiated networks. Analytical frameworks have emerged
that focus on how power is retained, obfuscated or exercised by central
government despite apparent decentralisation, including ‘asymmetric net-
work governance’ (Goodwin and Grix 2011), ‘blame-shifting’ (Hood 2010)
and an ‘asymmetric power model’ of the state (Marsh, Richards, and Smith
2003). Metagovernance has emerged as a particularly insightful conceptual
framework for scholars interested in ‘how the institutional and organiza-
tional structure of the state aﬀords government the ability to manage net-
works’, even without traditional ‘hard’ tools of government (Baker and
Stoker 2012, 1028). Existing studies have theorised how, once recalibrated,
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central government retains capacity and ‘tools’ to manage governance net-
works and jurisdictional authorities ‘from a distance’. To date, however,
research has not focused on how the preferences of core executives have
been institutionalised in the process of reforming central-local and intra-
local relations. While much existing work has been of a theoretical nature,
and interview-based research has shown how core executives ‘metagovern’
delegated and decentralised bodies, empirical studies of the processes
through which network relationships are (re)established remain lacking. As
Qvist (2017, 2) recently argued, a ‘diversiﬁed understanding of network
formations . . . is . . . not yet fully incorporated into governance research’
(see also Temmerman, De Rynck, and Voets 2015). Understanding how
such relationships are established through the ‘hands-oﬀ’ tools of network
framing and network design is crucial in explaining how the central state
embeds its preferences in local governance networks that are often reticent
to implement central state policy.
In making the above contribution, we examine the reconﬁguration of
governance networks in England between 2010 and 2015 under the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, via a programme of
so-called devolution deals. These ‘deals’ gave speciﬁc autonomy for city-
region authorities over particular budgets, but the UK Treasury shaped
substantially the conditions of how these budgets could be used. By attach-
ing particular ﬁscal conditions to the ‘deals’, designing the form of the
networks to empower business actors, and discursively framing this ‘devolu-
tion’ agenda, government actors ‘steered’ these networks during their
reconﬁguration towards capital spending, improving service provision and
ﬁscal consolidation. The speciﬁc hands-oﬀ tools of metagovernance we
identify can be situated within a longer term history of attempts by the
state to discipline local governance networks, which, in the UK, have often
been resistant to centrally driven plans, despite being highly dependent on
centrally distributed budgets. Such attempts are not necessarily nefarious,
novel or part of a grandiose or coherent ‘masterplan’. Rather, they are
attempts to shape the preferences and practices of local actors to accom-
modate the priorities of central government in processes of complex, messy
political bargaining over the shape and scope of networks as they are
reconﬁgured. The key question this article addresses is therefore:
● What is the logic of governance that informed the reconﬁguration of
local governance networks in England between 2010 and 2015?
A mixed-method approach was adopted which combines qualitative inves-
tigation of the City Deals and broader governance restructuring justiﬁed
through the so-called Northern powerhouse rhetoric with a quantitative
investigation of the discourses of devolution advocacy in which policy
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documents and think tank reports were analysed using NVivo software.1 This
methodology builds upon existing interview-based research that provides
indicative evidence of devolution as metagovernance, including the empiri-
cal investigations of O’Brien and Pike (2015) and Ayres and Pearce (2013).
Our approach provides a broad picture of the devolution discourse that
complements these studies’ focus on the self-reported experiences of local
council oﬃcials, conﬁrming their ﬁndings that these oﬃcials feel constrained
by central objectives.
This article proceeds in four sections. First, it is argued that the concept of
‘metagovernance’ provides a useful frame through which to examine how
the central state exerts power through framing or designing devolution.
Second, the case of English devolution deals is introduced and it is argued
that this case provides important insights into what ‘hands-oﬀ’ metagover-
nance entails. Third, we argue that the UK Coalition Government’s designing
and framing of the devolution agreements institutionalises and inculcates
ideas about what local government ought to be doing. These ‘hands-oﬀ’
tools are manifested in (1) the composition of the local governance net-
works, (2) ﬁscal conditioning and (3) the discursive construction of the goals
of the ‘empowered’ actors. In conclusion, we set out key implications for
future research, conceptually and empirically.
Beyond ‘government to governance’, towards metagovernance
This article focuses on how governance networks are shaped by metagover-
nance strategies, which seek to embed central state priorities and objectives of
achieving economic growth and enhancing public services. Metagovernance
has recently emerged as an important concept for understanding the role of
central government in the context of increasingly complex, decentralised
governance networks (Marsh 2011). It refers, in Jessop’s (2016, 9) words, broadly
to ‘the governance of governance’. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne metagover-
nance, drawing on insights from Jessop (2003), Meuleman (2008) and Fawcett
and Daugbjerg (2012), as the governance of governance networks conducted by
the central state as a privileged (although not uncontested) site of political
authority. It is crucial to further specify two aspects of this deﬁnition: govern-
ance networks and political authority. We deﬁne ‘governance networks’ follow-
ing Sørensen and Torﬁng (2016, 5) as the ‘horizontal institutionalisation of the
interaction of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who colla-
borate in a shared eﬀort to deﬁne and create public value through a process of
regulated self-regulation’. English devolution, in our case, can be seen as the
creation of decentralised arrangements (‘institutionalisation of interaction’)
between local and regional government agencies, councils, private and third
sector bodies (‘interdependent but operationally autonomous actors’) in deli-
vering public services (‘deﬁning and creating public value’). Crucially, this
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deﬁnition corresponds to metagovernance because in order for the state to
‘govern’, these networks need to ‘self-regulate’, a ‘meta’ regulation of conduct.
This personal or organisational self-regulation is governed by an overarching
‘political authority’. In this case, the authority is the central state (deﬁned as
national-level ministerial departments) which ‘governs governance’ and is
hence the ‘metagovernor’. Political authority is deﬁned as the resources, rule-
setting capacities and agenda-setting capabilities enabling an actor (or group
of actors) to shape the practices and preferences of other actors in governance
networks. As such, political authority provides the conceptual link joining
metagovernance with power, namely it is through ‘metagoverning’ – meaning
asserting political authority – that the central state exercises power over
governance networks.
The above deﬁnition allows for the possibility that metagovernance can
be carried out by non-state and private actors (Stark 2015). However, we
follow Jessop (2003, 65) in arguing that central states are crucial to analyse
in relation to metagovernance, because they ‘provide the ground rules for
governance and the regulatory order in and through which governance
partners can pursue their aims’. Recent empirical research supports this
argument that the state continues to be central in shaping governance
networks (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Matthews 2013).
How, speciﬁcally, does metagovernance work? Sørensen and Torﬁng’s
(2005) framework of metagovernance ‘tools’ provides a useful analytical frame-
work when disaggregating the diﬀerent forms that metagovernance takes:
(1) Network design that aims to inﬂuence the scope, character, composi-
tion and institutional procedures of the networks;
(2) Network framing that seeks to determine the political goals, ﬁscal
conditions, legal basis and discursive storyline of the networks;
(3) Network management that attempts to reduce tensions, resolve con-
ﬂicts, empower particular actors and lower the transaction costs in
networks by providing diﬀerent kinds of material and immaterial
inputs and resources;
(4) Network participation that endeavours to inﬂuence the policy agenda,
the range of feasible options, the premises for decision-making and
the negotiated policy outputs (Sørensen and Torﬁng 2005, 236–237).
The ﬁrst two tools can be described as ‘hands oﬀ’ – that is, being utilised
during the reformulation of the decentralised governance network. Ministers
in central governments can empower network actors when setting informal
ground-rules of which actors are involved (or excluded) from networks
(‘network design’). They can also use ‘hard’ legal or ﬁscal instruments to
require certain practices be observed, conditions be met or actors be
empowered within governance networks, as well as framing the aims and
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goals of networks in speeches and policy documents (‘network framing’).
These tools are of most interest to us. In the reformulation of governance
networks, political authorities have the capacity to set particular informal
norms, deﬁne the aims and goals of the network and include certain actors
over others in discussions.
Existing empirical research tends to focus on the latter two of Sørensen
and Torﬁng’s strategies. For example, Bell and Park’s (2006) study of water
governance in Australia and Whitehead’s (2003) analysis of urban regenera-
tion in England focus on the implementation phase of networks, where the
management of networks and state attempts to participate in them ran up
against practical diﬃculties and political conﬂicts. Koch and Buser (2006)
examine metagovernance in the implementation of public–private partner-
ships in Denmark (Koch and Buser 2006), while Haveri et al. (2009) again
focus on metagovernance in ‘practice’ of Finnish and Norwegian local
governance, emphasising the roles of ‘experts’ and Parkins (2008) examines
how metagovernance worked through state ‘coordination’ in response to a
Pine Beetle epidemic in British Columbia (Parkins 2008). Thus, this literature
mainly focuses on ‘practical’ metagovernance – network participation and
management – and its various pitfalls.
Temmerman, De Rynck and Voets (2015) make a contribution which our
own article builds upon, discerning all four aspects of Sørensen and Torﬁng
(2005) metagovernance strategies, in the implementation of Flemish local
government reform. Their study concludes that ‘while the four roles are
clearly helpful to discuss metagoverning activities at a general or conceptual
level, it becomes much harder to precisely delineate them in an actual case.
Most notably, the distinction between framing and designing is not always
clear’ (Temmerman, De Rynck, and Voets 2015, 239). This article responds to
their ﬁndings by empirically exploring ‘network design’ and ‘network fram-
ing’ as modes of metagoverning through ‘hands-oﬀ’ tools. Temmerman, De
Rynck and Voets (2015) mainly focus on the functioning of a network once it
has been established, while we argue that expanding the analytical time-
scale helps to distinguish and substantiate the concepts. Speciﬁcally, we
show how state authorities structure networks formally and informally
through using these two metagovernance strategies (Table 1).
In using the ‘network design’ tool of metagovernance, ministers are using
a ‘formalised’ aspect of their political power, or what Torﬁng et al. (2012, 48)
Table 1. ‘Hands-on’ and ‘hands-oﬀ’ metagovernance.
Stage at which metagovernance occurs
Strategies of metagovernance
Formal–legal Informal–discursive
Network re-formulation (hands oﬀ) Network redesign Political reframing
Network maintenance (hands on) Network management Network participation
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calls ‘the ability to shape and secure particular outcomes’. Shaping and
securing particular outcomes can involve the creation of rules and proce-
dures that keep certain issues oﬀ the agenda, whilst locking others on (qua
Steven Lukes’ 1974 ‘second’ faces of political power, ‘agenda setting’).
Second, outcomes can be shaped and secured ‘indirectly’ through discourse,
deﬁned as ‘the normative premises for formulating and selecting joint
solutions’ (Torﬁng et al. 2012, 57). The discursive prevalence of particular
ideas shapes the preferences of relevant audiences, embedding the privile-
ging of certain outcomes. This relates to the second tool, ‘framing’. The
‘metagovernors’ at the centre will negotiate the utilisation of the strategies
with network members, under conditions of interpretation and contestation.
This will certainly be the case in the later stages of network implementation.
Our focus here, however, on network reformulation foregrounds the need to
focus on highlighting the metagovernance tools used by government to
shape and steer the creation of ‘devolution deals’ in the case of the 2010–15
UK Coalition government.
The English devolution deals
In order to demonstrate the presence of ‘hands-oﬀ’ metagovernance tools in
the process of network reformulation, this article analyses empirically the
development of the UK government’s ‘devolution deals’ in England from
2011 to 2015. In light of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence,
there were renewed calls for the empowerment of English regional govern-
ments. Despite the resounding rejection of a devolved parliament in North-
East England in 2002 and the creation of Mayors in 2012 across a series of
referenda, a coalition of civil society groups and political parties had devel-
oped in favour of English devolution by the early 2010s (Kenny 2014).
Momentum for English devolution was driven by an increasing number of
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the midst of a prolonged recession
(particularly in the North) and the austerity foisted upon local governments
(and the resistance to it). Kenny (2014) identiﬁed a growing tide of support
for devolution within the Conservative party backbenches, whilst Bentley
and Pugalis (2013, 270) observed a ‘grammar of localism’ permeating the
rhetoric of the Coalition Government (even if it did ‘mask a contextual
history of centralisation’). The Department for Communities and Local
Government consequently ‘invited’ regions to submit ‘proposals’ for deals
that would involve the transfer of resources to regional level authorities, but
the resources and governance mechanisms handed to each region have
been highly divergent (see Table 2). This case thus presents a particularly
noteworthy case of a peculiarly asymmetric arrangement of governance
networks, which motivated our study to understand how they came to be
constituted in that way.
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Our analysis proceeded through assessing the English devolution deals
through the analytical lens of ‘hands-oﬀ’ metagovernance – network design
and network framing – in order to understand how power was reconstituted
by these agreements. The design category involved analysis of the structure
and terms of all eight concluded devolution ‘deals’ (see Table 2). Drawing
upon parliamentary select committee analysis of the deals, we undertook a
systematic assessment of power relations within the structure of the networks
and powers retained by central government in each ‘deal’. This investigation
complements the extensive interviews undertaken by O’Brien and Pike with
the lead actors in 28 ‘City Deals’, and Ayres and Pearce on the perceptions of
government oﬃcials in the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills on
the devolution agenda’s purpose (O’Brien and Pike 2015; Ayres and Pearce
2013). The assessment covers the ‘design’ of the networks in terms of their
formal resources allocated, membership and terms. The second analytical
phase focused on discursive ‘framing’, with a particular focus upon the
discourse of devolution advocacy presented in 91 documents (2011–2015).
This allowed us to make an assessment of the discursively framed goals,
targets and expectations of devolution (see Annex).
Network design: What’s the deal?
How, therefore, has the British state maintained, or even expanded, its inﬂu-
ence over the devolved (and supposedly empowered) regions of England
today as a result of the English devolution deals? How has it reworked the
institutional relationships between local areas and Central Government, inter-
regional relations and intra-regional relations in a way which allows it to shape
and guide the priorities of the reconﬁgured networks of governance?
England has a long and deep-seated history of centralism (Richards and
Smith 2015), and some have claimed that the recent wave of devolution has
challenged the relevance of this characterisation (Bogdanor 2004). In these
particular devolution packages, the two hands-oﬀ tools of metagovernance
can both be identiﬁed which illustrate how Central Government retain their
ability to exert their inﬂuence through ‘network governance’. The application
of the tools of network design (inﬂuencing the ‘scope, character, composition
and institutional procedures of the networks’) and network framing (shaping
the ‘political goals, ﬁscal conditions, legal basis and discursive story-line of the
networks’) will be rigorously explored in the following analysis.
Evidence of network design is manifest, with Central Government setting
the rules of the game in two key ways. First, the character of powers being
bequeathed by Whitehall conforms to a ‘local delivery of central objectives’
model of devolution. Second, Central Government has exerted arms-length
inﬂuence over the devolved regions through curating (with a signiﬁcant
degree of coercion) the composition of these reconﬁgured networks of local
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governance so that they include mayors in certain city-regions and Local
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which serve to constrain the actions of the
long-mistrusted local authorities.
Remoulding local governance networks
A further ‘hands-oﬀ’ network design tool of exerting inﬂuencing over the
local governance network is the ability to determine the composition of
those networks. In the case of the English City Deals, Metro-Mayors and LEPs
have been forcefully inserted into the renewed local governance structures
by Central Government. Playing such a domineering role in curating these
networks and ﬁxing institutional relationships has allowed the state to set
the ‘rules of the game’ and erected the constraints in which Local
Authorities will operate going forward.
The proposal of City Mayors was rejected by a host of cities in 2012, including
Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheﬃeld, Nottingham, Coventry, Newcastle and
Bradford. Despite the resounding rejection, the Coalition Government exhibit a
ﬁerce determination to assert ‘Metro-Mayors’ into local politics. As well as con-
stituting a remarkably undemocratic imposition of a democratic institution, the
insistence of Metro-Mayors being created demonstrates the enthusiasm Central
Government has for the idea of a ‘Boris in every town’. This is unsurprising given
the remit of the Mayor of London, which the City Deals are attempting to
duplicate. The Mayor of London is primarily tasked with presiding over public
transport, economic development, policing, ﬁre services and strategic planning
in his/her role at the head of the Greater London Authority. The development of
the Metro-Mayor role has been an incremental and patchwork process, but the
role is ultimately concerned primarily with the economic objectives of the
Treasury (Gains 2016), and the Metro-Mayors elected in May 2017 will be tasked
with delivering this speciﬁc remit.
Given the Mayoral remit and its close relationship with the objectives of
Whitehall, it is unsurprising that Whitehall representatives have prompted
the creation of this position in other areas of the country. The institutiona-
lisation of this position could eﬀectively embed Whitehall’s priorities and
logic at the local level. The apparent success story of the Greater London
Authority is ostensibly the blueprint of governance underpinning current
negotiations. This particular reworking of local economic governance in
1999, with a Mayor as its strategic coordinator, has been lauded for orches-
trating London’s economic boom. The praise for the GLA has been such that
its creation may well turn out to be an important watershed moment in
local economic governance within the UK. It is this model which is being
replicated today throughout the so-called Northern powerhouse, making
the City-Region Mayor a key (and non-negotiable) component of the
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reconﬁgured and empowered local governance networks in the minds of
those in Whitehall (Figure 1).
The institutional powers bestowed upon LEPs are equally controversial.
In 2010, the Coalition Government abolished Regional Development
Agencies and Regional Chambers as the locomotives of economic reba-
lancing and supplanted them with a style of governance whereby local
policymakers would work closely with local businesses, represented by
the newly created LEPs, in order to best appropriate their allocation of
capital expenditure (Pike et al. 2015). HM Government (2010a, 13) antici-
pated that the LEPs would provide the ‘clear vision and strategic leader-
ship necessary to drive sustainable private sector-led growth in their
areas’, which speaks to the inclination to shun statist approaches to
tackling uneven development and integrate business interests into the
policy-making processes (particularly in those areas of the country more
predisposed to progressive politics). There are now 39 regional LEPs in
England and their inﬂuence has steadily grown.
The most egregious development of their power is that, as of November
2015, their permission is needed for a business rate premium to be levied
upon them, as George Osborne announced in the 2015 Autumn Budget
Statement (HM Treasury 2015a). This is a remarkable amount of power for an
unelected body and constitutes a disciplinary mechanism, enforced by
Central Government, in order to punish networks which are resistant to
cultivating ‘business friendly environments’. It is underpinned by a certain
idea of what local authorities should be doing.
Moreover, LEPs obtain investment capital from Central Government (spe-
ciﬁcally, the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG))
rather than through their local network partners; an idea promoted by
Michael Heseltine (2012) in ‘No Stone Unturned’. Today, around £2 billion
is made available annually to the ‘Single Local Growth Fund’, from which the
39 LEPs may submit proposals to claim a share of for the purposes of local
economic development (Johnstone 2016). As of March 2016, £7.7 billion had
been allocated to the LEPs for projects intended to upgrade infrastructure,
improve skills and create jobs (Wharton 2016).
Former Communities Secretary Greg Clarke (2015) declared that ‘no
devolution deal will be signed oﬀ unless it is absolutely clear Local
Enterprise Partnerships will also be at the heart of arrangements’. LEPs
therefore are becoming an increasingly prominent part of local politics,
despite their lack of democratic accountability, because of the belief in
their ability to spur local growth through empowering them to help deter-
mine local business taxes and spending priorities.
The reconﬁguration of local governance networks can be seen as a key
component of the State’s ‘hands-oﬀ’ assertion of inﬂuence over devolved
polities. Mayors and LEPs are actors which will serve particular roles and
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possess particular remits in these networks which will encourage a certain
rationale of governance at the local level. In this way, as noted by O’Brien
and Pike (2015), these devolution agreements are not just a reworking of
state–local relations but also the imposition of a framework which alters
Figure 1. City-regions with an elected Metro-Mayor.
Source: Centre for Cities
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intra-local relations. This emerging mode of local governance establishes the
structures which aligns the local political agenda with Treasury objectives.
This dovetails with the interviews of government oﬃcials in BIS con-
ducted by Ayres and Pearce (2013). One senior oﬃcial particularly explicitly
pondered how localities could be encouraged to adopt the priorities of his/
her own department:
What is it that would change the culture of localities so that there is a sense
that the economy is important and not just a national issue? What would
change the culture of local authorities to get them to think that it is their job?
That is what I would like to know and that’s the direction that we have to
go in.
Ayres and Pearce (2013) concluded that the devolution agreements were
being interpreted heterogeneously by Central Government departments,
producing Police and Crime Commissioners and Academy Schools inter
alia from the Home Oﬃce and the Department of Education, respectively.
However, in the areas of economic development, planning and transport
local areas are being strategically awarded the most autonomy in order to
promote the prioritisation of growth (Ayres and Pearce 2013).
Network framing: What’s the point?
The second of Sørensen and Torﬁng’s (2005) ‘hands-oﬀ’ tools of metagover-
nance, which can be identiﬁed and empirically substantiated in the recent
wave of English devolution, is network framing. This speciﬁcally denotes the
shaping of ‘political goals, ﬁscal conditions, legal basis and discursive story-
line of the networks’.
The state exerting its inﬂuence through network framing is evident here
in two ways. The ﬁrst regards ‘ﬁscal conditions’ and concerns the increasing
conditionality attached to local government expenditure by central govern-
ment resulting from the combination of austerity measures and the confer-
ring of selective budgets earmarked for particular purposes (invariably
capital investment in order to boost local growth). Second, the goals and
discursive storyline of the devolution process are being shaped by the
‘devolution revolution’ and ‘Northern powerhouse’ discourses which trans-
mit accountability for growth and public service delivery in the public
consciousness.
Fiscal conditioning
Framing local governance is partly orchestrated through ﬁscal conditioning.
Local government budgets have not only been radically reduced since 2010
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but central government has increasingly, as part of the City Deals, been
earmarking budgets for particular purposes.
Signiﬁcant ‘growth accelerator’ or ‘growth investment’ budgets have
undoubtedly been transferred to local hands as a result of the City Deals,
designed to help regions address local economic shortcomings. For
example, the Liverpool City Council (along with the Liverpool LEP) has
been awarded control of the ‘Liverpool City Region Single Investment
Fund’, worth £30 million per annum over 30 years, the Greater
Birmingham City Deal included the ‘Skills for Growth Compact’, and the
Bristol City Region was awarded an ‘Economic Development Fund’ (Ward
2016). However, the transfer of these budgets must be contextualised by
austerity and its eﬀects on local government resources. Local
Government has taken the brunt of the George Osborne’s deﬁcit reduc-
tion strategy, with a precipitous real-term reduction of over 40% in
funding provision (HM Treasury 2015b, 78). The bequeathing of addi-
tional budgets designed to accelerate growth is meritorious when ana-
lysed in isolation, but in the context of diminishing local government
budgets, it is clear that Central Government is determining an increasing
proportion of governmental capital. Put simply, the central British state
has been taking with one hand and giving with the other with strings
attached.
This reshaping of local government spending is guided by a particular
vision of what local governmental networks should be prioritising. The
conditionality attributed to local government ﬁnancing can be understood
as centralisation by stealth. Of course, it remains preferable for local autho-
rities to be awarded these budgets rather than not. The growth accelerator
budgets have been succour to local areas. However, these budgets only
partially compensate for the retrenchment of ﬁnancing, and, worse still,
represent the arms-length inﬂuence of Central Government over a growing
proportion of local government spending.
Powers over immigration, welfare and energy policy have not been
within the parameters of negotiation with the representatives of central
government during the recent wave of devolution talks. Instead, despite
the heterogeneity of the deals, the budgets devolved tend to centre upon
skills, transport, ‘business support’ and strategic planning (see Table 2). They
thus correspond to the pre-existing priorities of the Treasury of promoting
economic growth and improving public service delivery. In this sense, what
we are witnessing is not decentralisation (i.e., an opportunity for local areas
to deﬁne their own political and socio-economic goals) despite the lan-
guage of ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-rule’ being deployed by its proponents.
Instead, this model of devolution is best conceptualised as a way for central
objectives to be delivered by local government. They are, thus, being
‘empowered’ only to the extent of wielding the budgets which will allow
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the Treasury’s traditional objectives to be optimally met. At best, this is an
example of what Maclennan and O’Sullivan (2013) describe as ‘policy dump-
ing’; the transfer of formal but not eﬀective policy responsibility. At worst, it
constitutes the covert shoring up of ‘central control’ through the ‘co-option’
of local elites (Richards and Smith 2016). The speciﬁcity of the devolution
deals, therefore, denotes the challenge being laid down to local governance
networks to transform themselves into the instruments of growth and
public service delivery.
The shifting composition of local government ﬁnancing reﬂects the
transformation in governmental spending in Westminster, with Osborne’s
budgets typically privileging capital spending on infrastructure designed to
stimulate growth, and incrementally restricting the capital available to
address the social hardship triggered by the 2007/2008 crash, subsequent
recession and austerity measures.
Those unwilling or unable to transform their governance priorities in such
a way will face further punitive ﬁscal costs as a result of the reforms made to
business rates. Central Government has allowed local areas to retain 100%
of ‘their’ business rate revenue and the authority to lower rates (although
not raise them). This ensures both the concentration of available govern-
mental capital in those areas already experiencing growth and the facilita-
tion and incentivisation of competition between neighbouring areas (Bailey
2017). Such reforms thus make their ﬁscal capacity predicated upon their
success in securing growth.
These covert processes of centralisation through ﬁscal constraints will be
more pronounced in poorer regions. These areas have suﬀered dispropor-
tionately from DCLG cuts (Berry and White 2014) and will anticipate a
residualisation in future tax receipts as a result of business rate reforms.
Save for an unforeseeable upturn in local economic fortunes (or an equally
unforeseeable upturn in generosity from Central Government), it is these
local authorities which will incur the steepest increases in the conditionality
of its resources, should they be awarded supplementary budgets at all.
Moreover, the ability to rescind devolved responsibilities at a later date
ensures a signiﬁcant mechanism of power retention for Central Government.
A largely overlooked insertion into the ‘Devo Manc’ agreement states that
‘the next ﬁve year tranche of funding will be unlocked if HMT is satisﬁed that
the independent assessment shows the investment to have met the objec-
tives and contributed to national growth’ (HM Treasury 2015c, 5). The
budgets which have been bequeathed to supposedly empowered local
governance networks could thus also be revoked (to far less fanfare one
would imagine) if future ‘performance evaluations’ deem that they have
been used ‘inappropriately’. This important but overlooked caveat sets the
precedent for subsequent devolution agreements and questions the extent
to which this vaunted process of devolution has been embedded.
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The discursive framing of political goals
The devolution narrative and the trumpeting of the anticipated outcomes of
it represents the second key aspect of networking framing utilised in this
instance. Several outcomes pertaining to the devolution narrative are deli-
neated by our research. The most notable of which are the delivery of local
economic growth and public service enhancement.
As the above chart illustrates, 41.6% of the arguments made in favour of
devolution were supported by promises of improved economic performance
(Figure 2). These were arguments which predominantly took the relationship
between devolution and growth as an article of faith but conﬁdently claimed
that localism would yield an economic dividend or ‘unlock growth’ (to use the
common verbiage). The landmark report fromMichael Heseltine (2012) entitled
‘No Stone Unturned: In pursuit of growth’ was seminal in postulating this close
relationship between devolution and growth. The Core Cities group were
prominent soon afterwards in acting as – in their own words – a ‘united voice
for the importance of our cities in delivering our country’s full economic
potential, creating more jobs and improving people’s lives’ (Core Cities
2013a). The conﬂation of local economic development and devolution has
been achieved in large part through their reports: ‘Competitive Cities,
Prosperous People: A Core Cities Prospectus for Growth’ (2013a), their series
of bulletins outlining a ‘Growth Prospectus’ and ‘Keys to the City: Unlocking
Urban Growth through Devolution’ (2013b). Respublica were also inﬂuential in
arguing that a recalibrated model of governance is the key to ‘unlocking’
growth and rebalancing the economy through unleashing infrastructure
investment and utilising local skills (Blond and Morrin 2014; Blond and Morrin
2015; Gregory and Dawber 2012). Left-leaning think tank IPPR North was
equally keen to herald decentralisation as a ‘plan for economic prosperity,
public service transformation and democratic renewal in England’ (IPPR
2014). Economic eﬃciency constituted a further 6.1% of the discourse.
Our research ﬁndings also revealed the prominence in oﬃcial documenta-
tion examined of linking devolution with an improvement in public service
delivery, with 23.7% of arguments in this category. The rhetoric again here
focused on how devolution would help break the ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach of
existing ‘bureaucracies’ and empower local actors to focus resources on ‘front
line services’, use resources innovatively, be less ‘dependent’ on central govern-
ment and collaborate with the private sector, and better channel investment
into locally speciﬁc transport, housing and infrastructure needs (Heseltine 2012;
Cabinet Oﬃce 2012; Cabinet Oﬃce 2014; Core Cities 2013c; IPPR 2014; Blond
and Morrin 2015). Many local government and Core Cities reports also argued
that the City Deals would supersede the hodgepodge of existing governance
arrangements, and the ‘red tape’ of bureaucracy generated by them, to pro-
duce a more ‘integrated’ approach and ‘better outcomes’ ( Core Cities 2013c).
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These two primary goals – constituting 71.4% of the devolution discourse – are
closely aligned to Treasury objectives and serve to transfer responsibility for
their attainment to the local level. The other elements of the devolution
advocacy, whilst not insigniﬁcant, were peripheralised in the discourse at the
aggregated national level.
These discourses played to the widespread disaﬀection with rising regio-
nal inequality, stunted regional growth since 2010 and the centralisation of
power by Westminster elites. The Northern powerhouse oﬀered the juxta-
position of prosperity, ‘localism’, autonomy, empowerment and rebalancing
(Blond and Morrin 2014). Yet, there should be scepticism that the devolution
deals are substantial enough to achieve such outcomes, or at least in a way
which is as geographically even as the discourse has been. The discourse has
taken no heed of the patchwork heterogeneity of the agreements nor
explicated presuppositions of improved economic performance. As many
in the economic geography ﬁeld have pointed out, the consistency of the
hubris is belied by diﬀerentiated capacities of city-regions to compete and
grow (Martin et al. 2015; Fothergill and Houston 2016; Hildreth and Bailey
2013). The theory of ‘agglomeration’ or urban clustering as a method of
generating growth has ostensibly informed this period of capitalist restruc-
turing in the UK as well as the spatial scale of the city-region itself (Beel,
Jones, and Rees-Jones 2016). However, the uniformity of the theory’s applic-
ability has been the source of enormous contention (Lee 2016; Martin et al.
2015; Fothergill and Houston 2016; Hildreth and Bailey 2013), with many
believing that the theory is neither based upon an accurate diagnosis of the
UK economy’s ills nor a solution to them (Martin 2015; Bailey 2017).
Furthermore, the concentration of governmental capital in the major cities
Figure 2. Prominence of outcomes in the devolution debate.
Source: Constructed by authors
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(or ‘engines of growth’) through business rate reform – again, justiﬁed
through the Northern powerhouse agenda – has actually blunted the
mechanisms of regional redistribution and threatened to exacerbate uneven
development (Bailey 2017).
The consensus on the expected outcomes of devolution in our study,
therefore, is remarkable. Even in areas which hope to secure the devolution
of fairly modest budgets with more modest levels of capacity to actually
deliver substantive change, the hyperbolic promises are similarly extant.
Actors both inside and outside of Westminster echoed and re-articulated
the belief that ‘greater prosperity’ and ‘rebalancing’ would be realised
through ‘local autonomy’, and ‘empowerment’, and in doing so could
prove to be the long-awaited formula capable of addressing ‘regional
inequality’, ‘uneven development’ (Core Cities 2013a, 2013b; Blond and
Morrin 2014, 2015; IPPR 2014). This consensus is instructive because it
insinuates that the discourse should be taken at face value but instead as
part of a broader negotiating process. The discourse of local government
actors, and their expectations of results which correspond so closely with
Treasury ambitions, reﬂects a willingness to make the case that they are best
positioned to most eﬃciently deliver Whitehall’s objectives through utilising
local knowledge to better appropriate resources. This represents another
conduit of ‘co-opting’ local elites through encouraging them to internalise
the devolution framing during negotiations. The communicative discourse
mapped out here, therefore, should be understood as an attempt to foster
goals and expected outcomes for local governance networks, in other
words, target-setting through discourse.
Devolution supposedly marks a ‘fundamental shift of power from
Westminster to people’ and an end to ‘the era of top-down government by
giving new powers to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and indi-
viduals’ (HM Government 2010b, 11). But this hyperbole surrounding the
‘devolution revolution’ and ‘Northern powerhouse’ disguises a minor techno-
cratic recalibration of delivery and even some notable processes of centralisa-
tion. This is partly signiﬁcant because devolution obfuscates or shifts
accountability for the perennially low-growth zones of the North and for the
decimation of public services resulting from unpopular austerity measures, in a
way which strategically enables future ‘blame games’ when desired results fail
to come to fruition (Hood 2010). The discourse then primarily fosters target
setting and seeks to shift responsibility for the economic recovery and the
enhancement of public service delivery. This can be understood through the
lens of metagovernance as being a crucial aspect of exerting inﬂuence over
local governance networks through network framing.
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Conclusion
The tools of metagovernance we have identiﬁed in this article – network
design and framing – occur during the recalibration of local delivery networks.
Design involves reconﬁguring who is involved in the network, and framing
involves discursively establishing the objectives and ﬁscal conditions of the
network. To date, the literature on metagovernance has not adequately
identiﬁed their presence, since it has focused primarily on metagovernance
during the ‘implementation’ phase of networks (Qvist 2017). By contrast, our
analysis of the recalibration of English governance networks helps us to
conceptually identify design and framing as key metagovernance tools and
shows how a particular logic of governance has informed the 2010–15 English
devolution deals. The implications of this article are threefold, covering con-
ceptual precision, empirical evidence and future research agenda.
First, and conceptually, our analysis demonstrates the added value of the
metagovernance concept to the governance literature. Some scepticism has
been voiced about whether ‘metagovernance’ genuinely oﬀers anything for
governance scholars beyond coining a new neologism (6, 2015). Our analysis
shows that metagovernance oﬀers added value by providing a framework
that explains the subtle means through which asymmetric relations between
actors within networks, networks in diﬀerent regions and central government
and regional networks are embedded. In other words, it oﬀers crucial insights
into how government claims about the desire to ‘decentralise’ power do not
come to fruition, because of the subtle framing and design aspects Sørensen
and Torﬁng (2005) identify, and we demonstrate empirically.
Empirically, we show the importance of analysing governance networks as
they are reconﬁgured. Governance researchers have been confounded in
recent years why eﬀorts at decentralisation do not deliver the desired plans,
primarily because of ‘accountability’ or ‘blame’ demands externally voiced
(Flinders and Moon 2011; Hood 2010). Our analysis here shows the mechan-
isms of metagovernance – the reconﬁguration of networks, ﬁscal condition-
ality and communicative discourse – that has reworked centre/local relations
and intra-local relations in a way which shapes and guides the priorities of
those local governance networks. The English devolution deals, despite the
rhetoric, did not herald the wave of decentralisation away from Central
Government which some of its proponents would have us believe. We do
not claim that it forms a novel ‘strategy’ which overtly informs, or explains, all
of government behaviour. There are clear inconsistencies and incoherencies
within the emerging agreements which establish limitations on the capacity to
exert central control and belie any understanding of devolution being part of a
nefarious ‘masterplan’. The analysis, however, can help us understand the
ostensibly paradoxical phenomena of power being hoarded at the centre in
the context of a purported ‘devolution revolution’. International observers
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might learn from this analysis that the metagovernance of decentralisation
arrangements, beginning as plans for their reformulation are debated, hold
crucial clues for how they come to institutionalise and embed social and
economic asymmetries between regions.
Lastly, future research should examine how the logic of governance
driving devolution we have identiﬁed may change under Theresa May’s
Conservative government. As Davies (2016) argues, May is less predisposed
towards the priorities of Whitehall and more concerned with ‘Hobbesian’
ideas about security and protectionism fostered during her tenure in the
Home Oﬃce. May has consequently been less enthusiastic about the devo-
lution agenda thus far. Future research might delve into the inner workings
of the central state, to examine the extent to which the Treasury continues
to drive the devolution agenda, or whether it is transformed or curtailed by
May’s leadership. However, May will need to navigate the deals already
institutionalised and the consequences (both intended and unintended)
they will create in the evolving political and economic context of Brexit.
Notes
1. Ninety-one documents were coded in terms of seven categories containing
common justiﬁcations for devolution: economic growth, democracy, eco-
nomic eﬃciency, identity, inter-regional inequality, environmental protec-
tion and public service delivery. A category called ‘risks and limits’ was also
included to capture instances where common downsides to devolution
were considered (e.g., the potential for a ‘postcode lottery’ in public services
was recognised). Each category contained a pool of subcategories giving
more speciﬁc guidance to coders on where a particular justiﬁcation could
be coded.
These categories were created from a review of existing devolution litera-
ture (both academic literature and practitioner documents were analysed,
including government and think tank reports). The coding scheme is
included in Annex, and the coded data will be uploaded online upon
completion of the project.
Coding using NVivo was ﬁrst conducted separately by an associated
researcher on the project, and one of the co-authors, who then met to
compare codes. The other co-author was consulted where there was dis-
agreement between them and a ﬁnal code was given after discussion and
agreement between all three.
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Annex
Documents were categorised as: central government, local government, civil society,
and think tanks. The discourse found in each document was coded according to the
various outcomes expected from ‘devolution’, including economic growth, eﬀectiveness
of public service delivery, democracy, inter-regional equality, economic eﬀectiveness,
identity and environment. We also coded for arguments addressing potential down-
sides and risks of devolution including failures of local leadership, exacerbation of inter-
regional inequalities, increases in bureaucracy and central government control over
local governments. The codes were initially developed on the basis of a literature review
of academic research on the potential beneﬁts of decentralised governance and subse-
quently extended inductively as themes emerged during coding.
Before research began, a framework of nodes and sub-nodes was established
which was broad enough to encapsulate the heterogeneity of the devolution
debate amongst its advocates. The deﬁnition of the nodes and the sub-nodes
was as follows:
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Recognition of downsides and the risks of devolution
Category Sub-category Meaning Example
Downside Weak areas Some places and regions will
lose out, especially those
less able to compete
‘will [new freedoms and
ﬂexibilities] be more
beneﬁcial to aﬄuent areas
than to less aﬄuent areas?’
New bureaucracy Devolution will create more
government posts, just at
the regional or local level
‘will a city region reduce the
number of politicians or
just add a fresh layer of
expensive bureaucracy on
top?’
Risk Local failure Local leaders may fail to fulﬁl
their responsibilities
‘doubt centres on
Westminster’s conﬁdence
in local government
competence’
Concern Disingenuous
discourse
Devolution is being used as a
cover for other aims of
central government such as
austerity or greater
Westminster control
‘“devolution for England”
would simply reinforce
London’s centralising
power within England, and
Westminster’s power
within that’
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